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This paper examines the contextual conditions for 
users’ career concern as a motivational driver of 
contributions in online collaboration communities. On 
the data of user-level activities from a computer 
programming-related online Q&A community (Stack 
Overflow), merged with job-market data for software-
developer, we find robust evidence of a positive 
association between individual users’ career concern 
and their contributions. More important, we find that 
this positive relationship is further strengthened 
through the contextual conditions: the number of 
vacancies in the job market, the expected salaries from 
these jobs, and the transparency in the flow of career-
related information within the community. We 
contribute to the literature on motivation in online 
collaboration communities. Our study thus offers 
insight into how career concern can be effectively 
utilized to motivate contributors in these communities. 
Our findings also foreshadow a possible paradigm 
change by characterizing online collaboration 
communities as institutions of career concern and skill 
signaling.  
1. Introduction  
The motivation of voluntary contributions to online 
communities of knowledge production and exchange 
has stimulated a deep interest in information systems 
researchers and practitioners [5,8,14,26,29,36,40,45]. 
One of the most relevant drivers of motivation is the 
starting or pushing forward of a professional career 
related to the community topic [30], to which we refer 
as career concern. For example, hobbyist product 
designers can kick-off a professional career by 
demonstrating their talent in design communities [17]. 
The notion of career concern as motivation is especially 
relevant for software developers because a large portion 
of their skills is difficult to observe for potential 
employers.  
Traditionally, people’s career concern and their 
seeking for jobs have been directly embedded into the 
institutions of higher education such as colleges and 
universities. By certifying individuals’ performance in the 
form of degrees and diplomas, these institutions allow 
them to signal their job-related skills to potential 
employers [23,39]. We argue that crowd-based online 
communities of knowledge production and sharing 
[5,8,14,45] can serve a similar role. These communities 
contain a large variety and depth of user skills that are 
often highly relevant for employers. In addition to 
multiple other forms of motivation [36], career concern 
has been shown to be an important source of motivation 
for making contributions to these communities [26,30], 
suggesting that online communities can in principle 
fulfill the function of institutions of career concern.  
However, career concern has been treated in the 
literature of online collaboration communities as a 
largely static construct [20,26,36], with little light on the 
conditions for the career concern to unfold. Therefore, 
we study the contextual conditions that support or 
inhibit the contributions of career-concerned users in 
online collaboration communities. By shedding light on 
the contextual conditions, we attempt to develop an 
understanding of when and how career concern is more 
likely to unfold and stimulate contributions. Building on 
the labor market literature [15,16,23,38,39], we develop 
a framework on the contextual influences of career 
concern, consisting of three conditions: number of job 
vacancies, expected salaries, and community–market 
information transparency. Job vacancies are the current 
number of job openings in the labor market, expected 
salaries are the current wages associated with these 
vacancies, and community–market information 
transparency is the degree to which community 
members and external recruiters can observe 
information about each other. To empirically examine 
this framework, we pose the following research 
question: How do external job-market conditions (job 
vacancies and expected salary) and community-based 
market conditions (information transparency) shape the 
relationship between career motivation and user 
contributions in online collaboration communities? 
Our empirical strategy is to utilize individual-level 





contribution data from Stack Overflow, an online 
collaboration community founded in September 2008. 
In Stack Overflow users post questions and answers 
(Q&As) on computer programming-related issues for a 
large variety of programming languages. In particular, 
we exploit Stack Overflow Careers1, which is an intra-
community career service. Stack Overflow Careers 
allows users to post a curriculum vitae (CV) and 
external recruiters to browse CVs and identify 
promising job candidates. Because users’ achievements 
in the community—in the form of reputation scores—
appear in their CVs, the users can signal their 
programming skills directly to the recruiters. Based on 
how much effort the users may have exerted to construct 
their CVs, we quantify their interest in a programming-
related career (i.e., career concern). Moreover, the 
introduction of Stack Overflow Careers was an 
exogenous event that drastically improved information 
transparency in the community. To capture the 
contextual conditions of the market for programming 
jobs, we obtain data from IT Jobs Watch2, a company 
that tracks IT-related job advertisements in the United 
Kingdom. The data contain the quarterly number of job 
vacancies and the offered salaries in over 110 
programming languages. 
We find that a user’s CV length—our proxy for a 
user’s career concern—is positively related to both the 
quantity and quality of the user’s contributions. This 
relationship becomes stronger when there are more job 
vacancies in the corresponding programming language 
and the expected salary from these jobs is higher. 
Increases in community–market transparency also 
positively moderates the relationship between career 
concern and user contribution. These results are robust 
to variations in the sample and estimation methods. The 
positive association between career concern and user 
contribution is particularly salient for the posts that 
could potentially earn more reputation points for the 
users. The career-motivated boost in user contribution 
appears to spill over to non-programming language 
domains as well, though the magnitude for non-
programming language domains is smaller than for 
language domains, which are presumably more 
conducive to signaling job skills. These results are 
consistent with career-motivated users optimally 
allocating their effort to maximize returns from 
investing private resources. 
Our study contributes to the growing literature on 
motivation in online collaboration communities [14] 
such as Q&A sites [45], open source software 
development [13,36,40], communities of practice 
[19,21,42], and collaborative knowledge production 
[2,32]. First, we provide a framework describing the 
                                                 
1 http://business.stackoverflow.com/careers/ 
contextual conditions for career concern to be effective. 
The framework reinforces the role of extrinsic 
motivations for contributors to online knowledge 
production and exchange. Specifically, we extend the 
current understanding of motivation based on career 
concern [26,30,36] by the notion of community–market 
transparency, that is, the ease of information flow 
between job seekers and recruiters. Community–market 
information transparency suggests an effective way to 
utilize users’ career concerns for addressing the 
challenges of attracting and motivating users and 
thereby promoting the overall viability of online 
communities. We also extend the literature by providing 
behavioral evidence based on archival data, thus 
overcoming the limitation of survey-based methods 
[26,30,36] and anecdotal evidence [22,34].  
More broadly, our framework sheds new light on 
online collaboration communities by characterizing their 
emerging role as institutions of career-related signaling, a 
role that has historically been exclusive to universities 
and other forms of higher education. Our findings 
indicate strong functional resemblances of online 
collaboration communities to these traditional institutions 
[3,23,39]. Thus, our study challenges a conventional 
paradigm on institutions of career signaling: knowledge 
workers are now able to signal their quality and job 
skills without necessarily relying on the traditional 
signaling institutions. We submit that this new paradigm 
of signaling provides considerable advantages in terms 
of cost and accuracy. It is quite likely that online 
collaboration communities will play a more 
fundamental role as signaling institutions in the near 
future. 
2. Hypotheses development 
We specify our framework into several testable 
hypotheses (see Figure 1). We first develop a baseline 
hypothesis on the relationship between career concern 
and user contribution. We then elaborate on the three 
contextual conditions as moderators of this baseline. 
 
Figure 1: Research model 
2.1. Career concern and user contributions 
Most fundamentally, we expect that a significant 
share of community users is interested in the prospects 
2 http://www.itjobswatch.co.uk 
Page 317
of entering or advancing a career related to their 
community activities. This form of motivation has been 
extensively researched in the context of open source 
software development [20,26,30,36] and, to a lesser 
extent, in other forms of online collaboration 
communities such as profession-specific communities 
of practice [42], open innovation communities [37], and 
Q&A communities [43]. Users will of course vary in the 
degree of their career concern. Some users may be 
uninterested in careers but still contribute for other 
reasons [36], while others might have a strong 
inclination for career seeking. The latter, we refer to as 
career-concerned or career-motivated users. 
The theoretical backbone for linking career concern 
to contribution behavior is signaling theory [23,39], 
which suggests that career-motivated users will try to 
demonstrate their otherwise-unobserved skills by 
contributing to their community. Here, their ability to 
provide costly contributions is considered as evidence 
for their skills. Therefore, for a baseline, we expect a 
positive association between a user’s career concern and 
the level of his contributions. 
Hypothesis 1 (H1): A user’s career concern is 
positively related to the user’s contributions. 
2.2 Number of job vacancies  
The number of job vacancies is the first factor in 
our framework and a key motivator for career-interested 
users. Compared to other decision-related indicators, the 
number of job openings provides a clearly identifiable 
information that helps career-motivated users develop 
an objective insight into the current state of the job 
market. Such information will then facilitate the 
decision of career-motivated users on how much effort 
to exert in contribution-based signaling.  
From a pure bargaining perspective, one might 
expect a negative effect of the number of job vacancies 
on the baseline relationship: more vacancies imply 
decreased competition among job seekers and greater 
bargaining power for them relative to recruiters, thereby 
reducing the need for signaling. As such, career-
concerned users may reduce their effort. However, from 
the cost-benefit based rational choice perspective, 
career-motivated users might actually increase their 
signaling effort in response to greater job availability. 
That is because the more jobs for a specific skill are 
available, the more attractive it will appear for an 
individual user to make investments in activities that 
may aid in obtaining a job. In fact, empirical 
investigations in traditional labor markets support a 
positive effect of job availability by showing that the 
market demand such as the number of available jobs has 
a positive effect on career decision-making such as job 
market entry and education degree attainment 
[15,16,44]. This suggests that job vacancies are very 
likely to positively affect the signaling activities of 
career-concerned users. 
This positive moderation of job vacancies is also 
consistent with the expectancy theory of motivation 
[41]. The theory, rooted in the question of career 
concern and job-related motivation [31,41], postulates 
the relationship between an individual’s effort and the 
desirability of the individual’s goal and the expected 
probability of goal achievement. The higher the 
desirability or the expectation of achieving it, the more 
effort the individual will exert [6]. Applying the 
expectancy theory of motivation to signaling in online 
collaboration communities suggests a positive effect of 
job vacancies on the baseline relationship. Career-
concerned users will intensify their signaling effort 
when the prospect of achieving their career goals 
appears higher (expectation increases). Thus, we expect 
that the association between a user’s career concern and 
her contributions strengthens as the number of job 
vacancies increases. 
Hypothesis 2 (H2): The number of job vacancies 
in the market positively moderates the relationship 
between a user’s career concern and the user’s 
contributions.  
2.3. Expected salary  
Similar to the number of job vacancies, the salary 
that a career-concerned user can expect from a job is a 
key moderator of the relationship between career 
concern and user contributions. For three reasons, we 
predict a positive influence of the expected salary on the 
baseline relationship. First, in general, there is a strong 
link between monetary incentives and human behavior 
[27], especially between expected income and career 
selection [15,38]. Second, job seekers can easily 
perceive and evaluate expected salary, and thus react to 
it. It is a straightforward criterion, which simplifies the 
comparison between different career alternatives, and 
hence it is likely to be used by the career-motivated 
users as a decision criterion. Third, compared to other 
job-decision criteria such as the location, size, or 
organizational structure of the employer, salary 
preferences are relatively homogeneous across 
individuals. All else equal, one would prefer more salary 
over less, whereas other preferences such as work 
location might vary widely among users. Because of 
these reasons, the expected salary is likely to exert a 
clearer effect than most other criteria. 
Hypothesis 3 (H3): The expected salary from the 
available jobs positively moderates the relationship 
between a user’s career concern and the user’s 
contribution 
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2.4. Community–market transparency  
The third and final contingent factor in our 
framework is the information flow between community 
and the job market. We refer to this contingency as 
community–market transparency, which represents the 
ease of information flows between community users and 
external recruiters. 
In general, transparency reduces the costs of 
transactions (for empirical evidence in financial 
markets, see [7,12]). Thus, we expect that in the context 
of online collaboration communities, greater 
transparency in the job-matching process should reduce 
frictions and search costs by improving information 
flows between the supply side (job seekers in the 
community) and the demand side (external recruiters). 
In several ways, community–market transparency 
benefits the job-seeking users in pursuing their career 
goals. Under greater transparency, these users can 
observe more and better information about opportunities 
in the job market. Community–market transparency also 
lowers the effective cost of sending signals, as it allows 
users to target selected employers instead of spreading 
their signaling effort across numerous targets. More-
focused signaling efforts on a select set of employers at 
a given cost allow the career-concerned users to produce 
more and/or higher-quality signals. 
On the demand side, community–market 
transparency has several merits for external recruiters. 
They can more easily target the talent. Greater 
transparency means an improved quality of the signals, 
which helps recruiters better screen job candidates, 
thereby facilitating their hiring decisions. These benefits 
for recruiters, in turn, create positive feedback for the 
supply side of the market, encouraging more users to 
seek career opportunities through the community. Gains 
from greater market transparency will then draw more 
recruiters to the market. “Thick market externalities” 
[11,18] may thus result: the job market becomes 
populated with more players on both sides, leading to a 
higher likelihood of matching between job seekers and 
recruiters and making both sides better off. 
These benefits offered by community–market 
transparency suggest that career-motivated users will 
likely adjust their contribution level responding to the 
degree of transparency. Under greater transparency, any 
changes in the job market get transmitted to career-
motivated users with less information loss. Likewise, 
with greater transparency, career-concerned users can 
expect their signals to more precisely reach recruiters. 
Hence, career-concerned users will find signaling 
through contributions to be more attractive in pursuing 
their career goals, thus increasing their contributions 
when community–market transparency is high.  
Further support can be derived from a behavioral 
perspective as well as the expectancy theory of 
motivation [41], such as in H2. Greater community–
market transparency increases the prospects of fulfilling 
career goals specifically because career-concerned users 
are more convinced that the signals they create in the 
online community can actually reach the intended 
audience (i.e., external recruiters). Without a clear path 
to these recruiters, users are less motivated to send a 
signal through contributions because there is little 
guarantee that the signal will reach the intended 
receiver. Thus, under low transparency, users’ career 
motivation remains largely latent and users are less 
likely to consider contributions as opportunities to 
signal. This weakens the link between career concern 
and user contribution. However, with a clearer and more 
effective information channel in place, the community 
and the activities inside it become more visible to 
external recruiters. Realizing this will in turn boost the 
motivation of career-concerned users to send signals 
through increased contribution. Hence, the link between 
career concern and user contribution gets strengthened. 
That is, given the level of career concern, a greater level 
of contribution is better justified. Together, these 
reasons suggest that under greater community–market 
transparency, the association between career concern 
and user contribution will become stronger. 
Hypothesis 4 (H4): Information transparency 
between the supply and demand sides of the job market 
(community–market transparency) positively 
moderates the relationship between a user’s career 
concern and the user’s contributions. 
3. Empirical design  
Our research context is Stack Overflow, a free and 
public online Q&A platform for computer 
programming-related issues. Career concern is highly 
relevant for the users in this online collaboration 
communities. According to a survey of over 56,000 
users,  more than three-quarters of the respondents 
expressed interests in a programming-related career by 
indicating that they were either actively looking for a job 
(15.5%) or open to new job opportunities (62.7%). 
Stack Overflow has a career service, “Stack 
Overflow Careers.” This service allows users to create a 
CV certifying their reputation scores. Paying recruiters 
can custom-search the CVs and list job advertisements. 
Thus, users can leverage their activities and reputation 
in the community as a signal and thus present 
themselves to potential employers. The community 
introduced this service in two stages. The initial version 
launched on (November 3, 2009) charged fees to both 
community users (a one-time $25) and recruiters 
(amount undisclosed). In the subsequent version “Stack 
Overflow Careers 2.0” (launched on February 23, 
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2011), Stack Overflow eliminated fees for community 
users. This change has considerably relaxed the users’ 
constraint, making it much easier for them to use Stack 
Overflow Careers. 
We believe that the introduction of Stack Overflow 
Careers has decidedly increased community–market 
transparency. Stack Overflow’s original intention was 
to help users find better jobs, rather than to directly 
promote user contributions. With the career service 
platform in place, job-seeking users can much more 
efficiently signal their quality to the recruiters. In 
particular, they can directly target the employers and 
jobs that match their career goals. Likewise, recruiters 
can identify and access qualified candidates more easily 
and at considerably lower costs. Hence, the introduction 
of Stack Overflow Careers must have significantly 
enhanced the transparency of the job market relevant to 
the users in the online collaboration community.  
We downloaded from the community’s website the 
entire user activity data in Stack Overflow over a time 
period of 5 years, from the outset of the community to 
June 2013. The raw dataset contains 14,630,209 Q&As 
written by 2,055,496 unique users. We also obtained 
job-market demand data from IT Jobs Watch, a 
company that maintains historical records of the IT job 
market in the U.K. The dataset contains quarterly data 
of the number of job vacancies and average salary offers 
for 113 programming languages from 2006 to 2015. 
Thus, each of these programming languages represents 
a segment of the IT job market. We only included users 
who contributed a total of at least 10 answers. The panel 
has 684,000 user-quarter observations of 72,444 users.  
Our dependent variable should capture the level 
of user contribution. Users can contribute to the 
community by posting frequently, or making high-
quality posts, or both. However, quality is observed only 
when a user makes any post. Hence, we primarily 
measure user contribution by the count of posts. To 
construct Quantity of contribution, we counted the 
number of total posts that a user made in each quarter. 
Because a user can contribute to multiple knowledge 
domains (language and non-language) but our job-
market data are specific to a programming language, we 
need to assign a primary language for each user-quarter 
observation. That way, we can precisely link the user 
response to demand changes in a specific programming 
language. Hence, we designated for each user-quarter 
the primary language based on his activity in the 
preceding four quarters.  
We also considered Quality of contribution. For a 
given post, other community users can evaluate it by 
voting up (+1) or down (-1). The resulting score netting 
these votes indicates the overall perceived quality of a 
contribution. We thus constructed a quality measure 
using the sum of net votes for the contributions in each 
user-quarter. 
Each of our four hypotheses requires an 
independent variable. For the baseline hypothesis 
(H1), we need a measure that captures the degree to 
which a user is interested in seeking a career. For this, 
we exploited the CVs posted on Stack Overflow 
Careers, which reveal two important pieces of 
information about users’ career concern: whether a user 
has posted a CV to the site and what content the CV 
contains. We use the estimated level of effort to create a 
CV as a proxy for a user’s career concern. All else equal, 
a longer CV will take more time and effort to put 
together and thus represent a greater level of career 
concern than a shorter CV. To construct the CV-based 
measure of career concern, we first searched the CVs of 
all users in our sample (74,008). Of these, 34,007 users 
(46%) have posted their CVs. We then constructed CV 
length by counting the number of words contained in 
each CV. This is our primary measure of the user’s 
career concern. We assigned zero for the users with no 
CVs posted.  
For testing H2, we captured the Number of job 
vacancies as the quarterly count of job advertisements 
for each programming language, compiled by the 
company IT Jobs Watch. For testing H3, we computed 
Expected salary as the quarterly average salaries offered 
for the permanent jobs in a given programming 
language, also collected by IT Jobs Watch. For the 
construction of Community–market transparency (H4), 
we exploited the introduction of Stack Overflow 
Careers. As discussed earlier, this career service 
promotes the information flow in both directions 
between community users and external recruiters. 
Recruiters can advertise job vacancies in a standardized 
format, which makes it easier for the users to find 
appropriate job postings. The service also improves the 
quality of the users’ signaling of their skills. Reputation 
scores earned through knowledge contributions are 
available to recruiters, who can then compare across 
multiple candidates on a common standard. Stack 
Overflow Careers initially charged fees for both the 
users and the recruiters but later made it free for the 
users after some time. We chose to distinguish between 
before and after the elimination of user fees (“Stack 
Overflow Careers 2.0”), which decisively made the 
service popular within the community, and constructed 
a binary variable called Post to indicate low (0) and high 
(1) community–market transparency.   
It is important to note that all the moderators 
representing the three contingent factors in our 
framework are exogenous to the community users. The 
number of vacancies and expected salaries are beyond 
the control of individual users and difficult to predict in 
a precise manner. The introduction of Stack Overflow 
Careers and the change of fees were also exogenous.  
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Most of our control variables consist of a series of 
fixed effects to account for possible confounding 
influences from other covariates of contribution 
activity. To account for the time-invariant user-level 
unobserved heterogeneity, we included dummies for 
individual users. Also, because other job-market 
conditions and user contribution behavior may differ 
across programming languages, we included dummies 
for programming languages. Quarter dummies were 
included to account for possible temporal variations. 
Programming-language-fixed effects and quarter-fixed 
effects were included in all estimation models. 
However, testing H1 prevents us from including user-
fixed effects because our measure of career concern (CV 
length) is time-invariant within the user. Hence, when 
testing H1, we used a random-effects model. Users may 
vary in experience, which may confound the effect of 
CV length. Thus, we controlled for user experience by 
including community tenure, measured by the number 
of days since the user joined the community. To account 
for the possible heterogeneity in writing propensity 
across users, we included the average length of posts 
(time-invariant) for each user in random-effects models. 
This variable may also capture some of the 
heterogeneity across users in writing style (some users 
tend to write longer than others) and hence partially 
correct for the baseline inter-user differences in CV 
length. We log-transformed all continuous variables to 
reduce heteroskedasticity. We used Stata 15. 
4. Results  
Model 1 in Table 3 shows the relationship of career 
concern with the quantity of user contribution using the 
(log) number of posts as the dependent variable. 
Consistent with our baseline hypothesis (H1), the 
coefficient on CV length as a proxy for career concern 
is strongly positive (Model 1). The estimated elasticity 
(0.032) implies that doubling the length of posted user 
CV is associated with a 3.2% increase in the user’s 
volume of contributions to the online community. 
Models 2-6 include user-fixed effects, where CV 
length needed to be dropped due to it perfect collinearity 
with user fixed effects (CV length is time-invariant 
within user). In Model 3 we find a significant and 
positive interaction of CV length and Number of job 
vacancies showing that the career concern–user 
contribution relationship is positively moderated by the 
number of vacancies. The career-driven users contribute 
more frequently when there are more jobs in their 
programming language available in the market, which 




Table 1: Quantity of contribution 
                        (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
(Log) # of 
days since 
join 
                        
-0.356** -0.284** -0.284** -0.284** -0.284** -0.284** 





                        




                        
0.032**      
(0.002) 
(Log) # job 
vacancies 
                        
0.027* 0.027* 0.021+ 0.027* 0.027* 0.023* 




                        
0.060 0.025 0.025 -0.036 0.024 -0.028 
(0.044) (0.045) (0.045) (0.048) (0.045) (0.048) 
(Log) CV 
length 
  × (Log) # 
job vacancies 




  × (Log) 
Expected 
Salary 




  × (Dummy) 
Post 
    0.013** 0.012** 
(0.003) (0.003) 
Constant 0.610 3.046** 3.053** 3.053** 3.059** 3.069** 
                        (0.508) (0.523) (0.524) (0.522) (0.523) (0.524) 
User FE No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Language FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Quarter FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
N                     682710 682710 682710 682710 682710 682710 
Within R2 0.102 0.103 0.103 0.103 0.103 0.103 
Note: The dependent variable in all models is the (log) number of posts 
received by the user in a given quarter. “Yes” or “No” indicates whether or 
not the corresponding fixed effects are included in the model. Robust 
standard errors, clustered by users, are in parentheses. +, *, ** denotes 
statistical significance at 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively. 
Model 4 tests the interaction between CV length 
and Expected salary. This interaction is significant and 
positive related to user contribution quantity, indicating 
that the career-driven users respond to a greater degree 
when the available jobs offer higher salaries. The first-
order effect of Expected salary is statistically 
insignificant as in other models. This suggests that any 
effect of expected salary on user contribution occurs 
only in conjunction with the user’s career concern, 
consistent with our moderation hypothesis. Hence, we 
found support for H3. 
In Model 5, we obtain a significantly positive 
coefficient on the interaction term between CV length 
and the Post. This supports H4, which predicts a positive 
moderation of community–market transparency on the 
career concern–user contribution relationship. Thus, we 
find evidence that career-motivated users contribute 
more frequently when information flows in the job 
market are under greater transparency. Considering all 
explanatory variables at once did not change the results 
(Model 6). 
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Table 2: Quality of contribution 
                        (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
(Log) # of 
days since 
join 
                        
-0.312** -0.271** -0.271** -0.271** -0.271** -0.271** 





                        




                        
0.034**      
(0.002) 
(Log) # job 
vacancies 
                        
-0.052** -0.053** -0.060** -0.053** -0.053** -0.058** 




                        
0.144* 0.154** 0.154** 0.088 0.152** 0.097 
(0.056) (0.057) (0.057) (0.061) (0.057) (0.061) 
(Log) CV 
length 
  × (Log) # 
job vacancies 




  × (Log) 
Expected 
Salary 




  × (Dummy) 
Post 
    0.014** 0.012** 
(0.004) (0.004) 
Constant 0.586 3.234** 3.241** 3.242** 3.248** 3.259** 
                        (0.635) (0.656) (0.658) (0.655) (0.656) (0.657) 
User FE No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Language FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Quarter FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
N                     678139 678139 678139 678139 678139 678139 
Within R2 0.157 0.157 0.157 0.157 0.157 0.157 
Note: The dependent variable in all models is the (log) number of votes 
received by the user in a given quarter. “Yes” or “No” indicates whether or 
not the corresponding fixed effects are included in the model. Robust 
standard errors, clustered by users, are in parentheses. +, *, ** denotes 
statistical significance at 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively. 
 
So far, we have focused on the number of posts 
(Quantity of contribution) as a measure of user 
contributions. The other measure of user contribution is 
quality (Quality of contribution), which represents the 
usefulness of the contributions indicated by votes (from 
other users). From the perspective of an online 
collaboration community as a knowledge depository, 
promoting contents of high quality is perhaps equally, if 
not, more important than sheer quantity. Thus, posting 
high-quality content is also an effective way of signaling 
their skills to potential recruiters. Hence, in the next 
step, we look at the quality of user contribution and use 
the (log) number of votes received as the dependent 
variable (Table 2).  
Models 1 through 6 in Table 2 replicate the 
corresponding models in Table 1. The results are very 
similar to that in the analysis of contribution volume: 
Quality is strongly and positively associated with CV 
length (Model 1); and the interactions of CV length with 
the number of job vacancies (Model 3), expected salary 
(Model 4), and the community–market transparency 
dummy (Model 5) are significantly positive in all 
models, including the full model (Model 6). Hence, the 
results suggest that career-motivated users respond to 
the market conditions by adjusting not only the 
frequency of their contribution but also the quality of the 
posts. This is reasonable because while the volume of 
contribution influences the visibility of a user in the 
community, it is the quality of contribution reflected in 
the reputation scores that determine the user’s status. 
Hence, users with a greater career concern have a clear 
incentive to boost both the quantity and quality of 
contributions. Overall, our analysis of user contribution 
provides solid support for all hypotheses. 
To improve the credibility in CV length as proxy 
for career concern, we developed two robustness 
checks. First, we distinguished between the types of user 
contribution by separately looking at user posting of 
questions versus user posting of answers to others’ 
questions. This analysis tests whether the users who we 
consider as career-concerned optimize their signaling 
behavior by focusing on contributions that might 
promise more signaling gains (i.e., answers, not 
questions).The test clearly shows that answers are more 
sensitive to the CV length than questions (roughly three 
times as sensitive). This provides support for using CV 
length as a proxy for career concern. Second, in a similar 
way we divided user contributions into two categories: 
posts in programming-language domains and those in 
non-programming-language domains. If CV length is a 
proper proxy for career concern, we would expect to 
measure that career-motivated users concentrated their 
efforts on specific knowledge domains (i.e., 
programming languages) that might be more 
representative of their skills so as to better signal their 
skills to external recruiters. We found that the effects 
driven by CV length are stronger when it comes to 
programming-related contributions. 
5. Discussion  
Our results provide strong evidence for our 
framework on the conditions of career concern as a 
significant motivator of user contributions in online 
collaboration. We document systematic relationships 
between users’ career interests, job-market demand 
indicators, transparency in information flow, and the 
quantity and quality of user contributions to the 
community. We first confirm a positive link between a 
user’s career concern and the user’s contributions 
[26,36,43]. Our analyses further show that changes in 
job-market demand conditions (number of vacancies 
and offered salaries) for a user-specific programming 
language skill positively moderate this career concern–
user contribution relationship. Finally, we find that the 
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increased community–market transparency, owing to 
the availability of Stack Overflow Careers, strengthens 
the positive relationship between career concern and 
user contribution.  
5.1. Contribution to theory 
Our study provides multiple implications for 
existing theory. We show that the motivating role of 
career concern is subject to market- and community-
level contingencies, extending and improving on prior 
research that has primarily focused on the direct effect 
of career concern on user contribution [26,36,43]. Based 
on large-scale archival data, we validate career concern 
as a motivational driver. More importantly, we identify 
the contextual conditions that unleash career concern. 
Our framework on the contextual conditions of career 
concern builds on the human capital theory and labor 
market theory, which identified the number of open jobs 
and the expected salaries as positive influences of career 
choices [15,16]. In addition, the labor market literature 
indicates the importance of information transparency 
[4,25]. By demonstrating the relevance of these 
conditions for online collaboration communities, we 
introduce a contingency theory of career concern in 
online collaboration. Together, these three conditions 
account for a more complete and coherent picture of 
career concern as a motivational driver in online 
collaboration communities.  
Our characterization of online collaboration 
communities as institutions for career concern has a 
strong implication for our understanding of the 
traditional institutions fulfilling that role. These 
institutions are the places of higher education, first and 
foremost the universities [3,23,39]. Comparing online 
collaboration communities to these traditional 
institutions prompts us to conjecture a possible 
paradigm shift in the configuration of signaling 
institutions. Traditionally, the function of the 
institutions of higher education is to certify the 
achievements of their “users” (i.e., students). Thus, they 
enable the students to signal their hidden skills and 
thereby improve their career prospects [3,39]. Our 
observations from Stack Overflow and the software 
developer job market suggest that online collaboration 
communities are also able to perform this role. 
Moreover, online collaboration communities even have 
a critical advantage over the institutions of higher 
education in fulfilling this role. The institutions of 
higher education contribute solely to the creation of the 
signal and the immediate outcome of the signal 
production process (i.e., exams and assignments) is 
usually wasted: “[S]tudents do work hard, because of 
reputation effects, even though it is entirely wasteful 
from a social point of view” [23:177]. In stark contrast, 
in online collaboration communities, the creation of the 
signal must provide an immediate benefit for other 
community users. Each contribution has at least one 
beneficiary (the asker of the question) and most often 
multiple beneficiaries, whose votes indicate the value 
they gain from the contributed content. In this way, the 
contribution’s actual value is tightly coupled to the 
signal. Because of this coupling, we contend that online 
collaboration communities as institutions of career 
concern reduce the “waste” relative to the traditional 
signaling institutions. This represents a critical welfare 
advantage. Therefore, it might be that online 
collaboration communities can substitute the traditional 
institutions in their role as signal enablers for certain 
job-related qualities. This would mean a paradigm 
change with an impact on social welfare.  
Another advantage of online collaboration 
communities as a signaling institution could be that 
inexperienced job-seekers could gain an easier entry to 
the job market. Because of the tight coupling between 
real-world values of the contribution and signal, online 
collaboration communities can help overcome the so-
called career progression paradox, the problem that 
recruiters demand experienced job seekers but to 
acquire experience, the job seekers need a job [33]. 
 Our study generalizes the role of career concern in 
user contribution beyond the context of open source 
software development, from which the original theory 
and literature of motivation by career concern emerged 
[30,36]. Our context differs from open source software 
development, which takes place in relatively more 
integrated organizations and handles more interrelated 
tasks such as coding, testing, and code integration [28]. 
Our context is based on flat structures [14] with virtually 
fully decomposable, atomic tasks. Nonetheless, our 
study also confirms the role of career motivation under 
these seemingly unfavorable conditions for pursuing 
career opportunities. Because online collaboration 
communities provide an arguably more conservative 
setting, we believe that our findings can be extended to 
the field of open source software development [30].  
5.2. Managerial implication  
We offer several implications for practitioners, 
especially managers and system designers of online 
collaboration communities. Perhaps the most important 
challenge for them is to attract and retain active users 
[5,9,14,35]. An effective way of achieving this is to 
enhance the transparency of career prospects by offering 
direct channels to potential employers. Our results 
indicate that enhancing community–market 
transparency boosts both the quantity and quality of user 
contributions to the community. Hence, instituting 
features that closer connect job-markets with the 
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community and improve the information between them 
is a useful strategy. Associated improvements in content 
quality facilitated by better community–market 
transparency are another merit to utilizing this 
instrument. Therefore, for community administrators, 
increasing community–market transparency can be a 
relatively low-risk high-return strategy for promoting 
the success of their community. 
Enhancing the community–market transparency is, 
of course, possible only if there are significant external 
career opportunities that demand for the knowledge and 
skills relevant to the community. For instance, for 
general Q&A communities such as Answers.com and 
Quora, it seems difficult to define what the relevant job 
markets are and external job opportunities may hardly 
exist. For these communities, community–market 
transparency is probably irrelevant. However, there is a 
broad range of online collaboration communities that 
can utilize community–market transparency as a 
motivational instrument. For example, companies that 
build on input from communities, such as firms relying 
on community-based customer support [24] or those 
using ideas and knowledge produced in the community 
[1,10,29], may well benefit from career-motivated 
participation and are able to create the right conditions 
to induce career-based motivation. The hosting 
companies themselves represent the demand side of the 
job market. Crucial for the hosting company in utilizing 
this hiring strategy is to offer well-payed jobs 
(corresponding to our variables, number of vacancies 
and expected salary) and most importantly, link career 
opportunities directly to contributions in the community 
and make this relationship clear to the community 
members thus increasing community–market 
transparency (corresponding to our variable with the 
same name).  
5.3. Limitations and future research 
Our study has several limitations as we discuss 
below, which provide interesting avenues for future 
research. First, our measure of career concern—CV 
length—is admittedly a crude measure, though this is 
our best attempt to quantify user career concern based 
on secondary data. It is also time-invariant, and hence 
conceals potential dynamics in the effect over time. This 
is because we do not know the exact timing of the CV 
posting. Thus, regardless of when the users posted their 
CV to Stack Overflow Careers, we treat them as if they 
were career-motivated from the time they appear in the 
dataset. However, it is entirely likely that users have 
posted their CVs only after they become interested in 
seeking careers, which may well be a while since they 
have been active in the community. It is also possible 
that after posting their CVs, some users have lost 
interest in seeking careers but left their CVs on the site. 
In either case, the actual link between CV length and 
contribution activity for these users will likely be 
weaker than assumed. Therefore, our estimate based on 
the time-invariant CV measure is likely to be a 
conservative one.  
Second, our empirical strategy is not suitable for 
capturing potential interactions of career concern with 
other sources of motivation, especially those of intrinsic 
nature. We are not alone in facing this limitation; 
scholars have generally analyzed career motivation in 
isolation from other forms of motivation (exception is 
[36]). Further research incorporating different 
motivations and their interactions is needed. 
Third, our job-market data cover only the U.K. 
Ideally, we would like to have region-specific data on 
jobs and salaries and match them with the users in the 
corresponding regions. Unfortunately, such data at the 
level of the precision of our data is not available. 
Though we find generally robust results on a narrower 
sample of EU users, caution may be necessary in 
applying the findings to the regions with IT labor 
markets that deviate considerably from that of the U.K. 
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